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Abstract
Previous research has shown that ideas which violate our expectations, such as schema-inconsistent concepts, enjoy
privileged status in terms of memorability. In our study, memory for concepts that violate cultural (cultural schema-level)
expectations (e.g., ‘‘illiterate teacher’’, ‘‘wooden bottle’’, or ‘‘thorny grass’’) versus domain-level (ontological) expectations
(e.g., ‘‘speaking cat’’, ‘‘jumping maple’’, or ‘‘melting teacher’’) was examined. Concepts that violate cultural expectations, or
counter-schematic, were remembered to a greater extent compared with concepts that violate ontological expectations
and with intuitive concepts (e.g., ‘‘galloping pony’’, ‘‘drying orchid’’, or ‘‘convertible car’’), in both immediate recall, and
delayed recognition tests. Importantly, concepts related to agents showed a memory advantage over concepts not
pertaining to agents, but this was true only for expectation-violating concepts. Our results imply that intuitive, everyday
concepts are equally attractive and memorable regardless of the presence or absence of agents. However, concepts that
violate our expectations (cultural-schema or domain-level) are more memorable when pertaining to agents (humans and
animals) than to non-agents (plants or objects/artifacts). We conclude that due to their evolutionary salience, cultural ideas
which combine expectancy violations and the involvement of an agent are especially memorable and thus have an
enhanced probability of being successfully propagated.
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Introduction
Research in psychology and anthropology has looked into the
question of what makes some ideas more culturally successful than
others. It has been suggested that cultural ideas enjoy a cultural
transmission advantage because they appeal to human cognitive
architecture [1,2,3,4,5,6]. The success of an idea is determined by
psychological factors, such as how attention is attracted to a
particular idea, and subsequently, how easily this idea is
represented and remembered [4,7,8].
In memory research, it has been suggested that items
inconsistent with our expectations are recalled better than those
consistent with our expectations [9,10,11,12,13,14], a phenome-
non often referred to as the ‘‘von Restorff effect’’ [15], or the
‘‘distinctiveness effect’’. Similarly, concepts violating our ontolog-
ical expectations seem to have a unique position in attracting
attention and leading to distinct encoding. Yet, research in the
area of cognition and culture has predominantly focused on
domain-level breaches, i.e., breaches in intuitive ontologies, with
the exception of several studies [16,17,18,19]. However, the role of
agents in memorability to conceptual information has been largely
overlooked. Throughout their ontogeny, humans become attuned
to understanding how actions and events in the world operate and
what can be expected or unexpected yet viable, i.e., they acquire
intuitive ontological assumptions [20,21], as well as assumptions
about who can perform those actions. When presented with
information, humans activate the potential characteristics of that
information and compare the incoming information with already
existing knowledge [22], making inferences about possible
outcomes of events and their respective probabilities and also
activating a set of expectations employed when encountering new
information [23,24]. Furthermore, the human mind is endowed
with core knowledge systems, which provide general inferences
about various domains (objects, actions, numbers, space), and new
knowledge is generated based on the foundations of those core
systems [25].
Focusing on the domain of religious ideas, Pascal Boyer [26]
introduced the notion of a ‘‘cognitive optimum’’ – a balance
between attention and cognitive effort. He argued that minimally
counterintuitive (MCI) concepts (those that include a limited
number of domain-level violations, such as ‘‘flying cat’’ or
‘‘stalking chair’’) are more likely to be remembered, and thus
more successfully transmitted. Such concepts infringe upon some
fundamental assumptions about domain-specific knowledge, like
intuitive psychology (theory of mind), biology, or physics [27,28].
This particular feature gives those ideas powerful inferential
potential, allowing for various inferences and interpretations,
resulting in their easier representation and memorability.
Experimental studies have suggested that the presence of mild
violations of intuitive ontological expectations in either concept
form or narrative material is optimal for human attention and
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memory, and thus beneficial for the transmission of those concepts
[1,2,5,29]. However, other studies suggest a more complex
picture, showing that context might play a more important role
in the memorability of individual concepts [30,31,32,33,34].
This variation in the results of the studies can be attributed
possibly to using different kinds of material (either at a narrative or
concept level), to the use of uncontrolled confounding variables
such as word length and word frequency, and/or to an
uncontrolled exposure duration of individual concepts. Impor-
tantly, processing time, which is a particularly important factor
both for attention and memory, was not controlled for in the
majority of extant studies as participants were permitted to spend
various amounts of time reading and studying concepts embedded
in stories [1,30,34,35] or concept lists [5,30]. This variability in
processing time might have resulted in attentional preference for
more unique, slightly bizarre concepts (such as minimally
counterintuitive concepts), with factors such as post-stimulus
elaboration making the memory trace less prone to forgetting
[36]. Only a few studies have controlled for confounding factors
such as processing time, word frequency and word length
[31,37,38]. Our study offers a precise examination of memory
for expectancy-violating concepts while controlling for these
confounding variables.
An additional factor that might bias the memorability of
concepts with violations to either domain-level or cultural schema-
level expectations is the presence of agents in the individual
concepts. A prominent attribute of religious ideas is that many of
them contain minimally counter-intuitive concepts in which non-
agents are ascribed with agent-like qualities (e.g., a whispering
rock). Moreover, another aspect of religious ideas is their
‘‘stickiness’’, due to the inclusion of agents possessing supernatural
qualities. The human propensity for detecting agents in ambiguous
situations is unavoidable and powerful [39], and has been related
to adaptive mechanisms that facilitate the identification of
potentially harmful agents [40,41]. It has been proposed that
humans have developed a sensitive hazard-precaution system to
defend themselves against potential dangers (predation, contagion,
intrusion by strangers etc.) [42]. Intentional agents in particular
might often represent a potential threat and therefore it is
extremely advantageous to be able to detect them effectively.
Thus, overattribution of agents, even when there is none [43,44],
might be a beneficial strategy for survival.
Based on the above, memory for agents (i.e. humans and
animals) should be stronger compared to memory for non-agents
(e.g., plants and objects) across all concept categories. Therefore,
examining memory for cultural schema-level versus domain-level
violations, each as related to agents versus non-agents, provides an
important addition to the current research on understanding the
memorability of cultural ideas.
Here, we present two experiments tapping into this problem by
using immediate recall as well as surprise delayed recognition
tasks. Both experiments were aimed at examining how ideas, in
our case concepts, entertain human memory according to the type
of expectation violation as well as the involvement of agents or
non-agents. Intuitive, schema-consistent information does not
violate any expectations: the concepts represent information that
can be encountered in the real world. Schema refers to the
employment of simplified, shared cultural knowledge that helps
predict and anticipate events, agents, and actions [41] by
representing their prototypical attributes that are available in a
specific situation [42]. Furthermore, we introduced two different
expectation violations. First, ontological (or domain-level) expec-
tation-violating ideas, i.e. ideas breaching intuitive ontologies; and
second, counter-schematic (or cultural schema-level expectation
violating) concepts- i.e. those violating culturally shared knowledge
while retaining intuitive expectations. Introducing these novel
factors in the study of concept memorability can potentially
elucidate some of the mechanisms underlying the success of certain
cultural ideas.
Methods
Ethics statement
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants
and the study was approved by the ethics committee of the Czech
Association for the Study of Religions.
Immediate memory recall
Our first experiment investigated the role of expectation
violation on subsequent memory recall. We used a simple task
in which participants were presented with concepts randomly from
three different concept categories. Two categories pertained to
expectancy-violating concepts. The first category included onto-
logical violations (ONT) which are claimed to be an important and
underlying component of the success of many cultural ideas [26].
These ideas violate intuitive ontologies, i.e., information pertaining
to the domains of folk physics (e.g., an object falling upwards), folk
biology (e.g., a singing tree), and folk psychology (e.g., a person
that can predict the future). The second category was represented
by concepts that violate cultural schema-level expectations, i.e.,
common or prototypical attributes of information stored in the
conceptual knowledge system. In other words, they violate cultural
intuitions and refer to cultural schema-level breaches (CUL) (e.g.,
an illiterate teacher or a wooden bottle), while ontological
intuitions are maintained. Cultural schema-level breaches comply
with expectations pertaining to folk biology, folk psychology, and
folk physics, but violate expectations related to culturally acquired
schemas. Finally, the third category was represented by intuitive
concepts (INT), i.e., concepts that refer to everyday, mundane
concepts, agents, and objects that do not breach any expectations
(e.g., a green pencil, a smart chemist, etc.). The aim was to
examine memory for individual concept categories. The individual
concepts used in the study are displayed in Table 1.
Subjects
Seventy-five undergraduate students (32 male and 43 female)
volunteered for the study. A total of 70 participants finished both
sessions of the experiment, and their data were included in the
statistical analyses for repeated measures analysis of variance. Fifty
of the participants were Czech students (28 female, 22 male; age
range: 20–23) at Masaryk University, while twenty-five partici-
pants (15 female, 10 male; age range: 19–25) were American
students at Columbia University. All students received one course
credit for participating in the study. All participants had normal or
normal-to-corrected vision, and none of them reported any
memory pathologies. The concept set consisted of 48 concepts
created for the purpose of the experiment. The concepts were two-
word combinations of an adjective and a noun. To avoid any
confounds caused by word frequency and length, we controlled for
both factors. Nouns and adjectives were matched across concept
categories for word length and frequency using the SUBLTLEXus
corpus database (available online). The SUBTLEXus corpus
(based on 51 million words) has been suggested as more suitable
for psycholinguistic research than other popular corpus databases
such as Celex or Brown corpus [54]. It was assembled from movies
and television series subtitles. We used word frequency via
SUBTLwf – an indicator of word frequency per million words.
Memory and Culture
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The concepts comprising the different categories (CUL, ONT,
INT) did not differ in terms of word frequency (target nouns:
F(2,45) = .46, p = .64; target adjectives: F(2,45) = 1.37, p = .27) or
word length (target nouns: F(2,45) = .34, p = .71; target adjectives:
F(2,45) = .83, p = .45). For the American subset of subjects,
individual concepts were presented in English, while Czech
participants were presented with equivalent concepts translated
into Czech. We used three independent translators, and only
concepts in which they agreed 100% were used. The experiment
was programmed in MATLAB (R2011b; MatWorks Inc., Natick,
MA) and was carried out on a 17-inch color screen laptop. The
viewing distance was approximately 50 cm.
Each concept could be classified according to the following
attributes: concept category, ontological category, and agent presence. Each
of the three concept categories consisted of 16 adjective-noun-pair
concepts. In total, 48 concepts were presented. Within each
concept category, 4 different ontological categories [22] were
presented in the form of nouns (human, animal, plant, object); the
adjective defined whether the concept was CUL (e.g., wooden
bottle), ONT (e.g., evaporating rabbit), or INT (plastic clock).
These four ontological categories defined the presence or absence
of agents. Human and animal ontological categories incorporated
a presence of agents, while plant and object categories represented
the absence of agents. The list of individual concepts can be found
in Table 1.
Procedure
Prior to the experiment, subjects were told that the study
involved learning concepts and their task would be to memorize all
the presented concepts as their memory would be subsequently
tested. The experiment consisted of three phases (study, distractor,
and test) repeated twice in order to determine the pervasiveness of
the ideas. During the study phase, the items were presented
randomly at the center of the screen (white print on black screen)
for 1500 ms with a 1000 ms interstimulus interval. A fixation cross
was presented at the center of the screen prior to each concept
presentation in order to indicate the beginning of a trial. The study
phase was followed by a distractor task. Participants were given
2 minutes to solve simple mathematical operations.
In the final test phase of the experiment, a free recall test was
presented. Subjects were prompted to recall all concepts, including
both adjective and noun, by typing them individually on the
computer screen. Correct recall required providing both compo-
nents of the concept, i.e., adjective and noun. The recall was
considered as accurate when both the adjective and the noun were
recalled as shown originally during the test phase. No feedback
was given during the free recall task. This sequence (the study
phase, the distractor task, the test phase) was repeated in order to
observe the pervasiveness of the concepts in memory (i.e. the effect
of repeated exposure on recall of individual concepts).
Results
A 36262 (concept category [CUL, ONT, INT]6agent
presence [present, absent]6test phase [immediate, delayed])
repeated-measures analysis of variance was computed in order
to examine the effects of concept category and presence of agent
presence on subsequent recall. There was a main effect of concept
category: F(2,138) = 41.30, p,.001, g2p = .37; and also a main
effect of agent presence: F(1, 69) = 10.01, p,.01, g2p = .13.
Unsurprisingly, we found a main effect of test phase,
F(1,69) = 79.79, p,.001, g2p = . 54 which demonstrated that
participants recalled significantly more information after the
second test phase. An interaction between concept category and
agent presence was also observed F(2,138) = 4.53, p,.05, with
rather small effect size, g2p = .07. Interactions between concept
category and test phase, agent presence and test phase, and
concept category, agent presence and test phase were not
significant (p = .13; p = .41, p = .25, respectively).
As illustrated in Figure 1, in terms of the overall recall (both
recall 1 and recall 2), follow-up t-tests using Bonferonni correction
revealed that memory for CUL concepts (M = 6.21, SE = 0.28)
Table 1. Individual concepts pertaining to cultural schema-level violations, ontological violations, or intuitive ideas.
Concept Category
Ontological Category CUL ONT INT
Human Atheist priest Flying waiter Classy artist
Blind driver Liquid butcher Honest writer
Illiterate teacher Melting teacher Salivating runner
Puritan whore Transparent pilot Smart chemist
Animal Carnivorous sheep Democratic skunk Drinking dog
Coward tiger Evaporating rabbit Galloping pony
Domestic bear Speaking cat Obedient horse
Herbivorous hyena Swearing koala Tame zebra
Plant Salty banana Barking grape Drying orchid
Soft cactus Jumping maple Green hedge
Stinky rose Racing tulip Growing pine
Thorny grass Vomiting birch Planted onion
Object Spherical room Hungry kettle Brown fence
Stone mirror Stalking table Convertible car
Triangle plate Talking train Green pencil
Wooden bottle Worried chair Plastic clock
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090684.t001
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was superior to both ONT (M = 3.28, SD = 0.28), t(69) = 8.71, p,
.001, and INT concepts (M = 4.11, SE = 0.23), t(69) = 5.95, p,
.001. Significant differences were observed between INT and
ONT concepts, t(69) =22.87, p,.01. These results (i.e., the
immediate memory advantage for INT over ONT concepts) are in
accordance with other studies [1,5].
For both expectancy-violating concepts, agents-involving con-
cepts were much better recalled than agents-devoid concepts. No
difference in terms of the presence of agents was found for INT
concepts. More specifically, for CUL concepts, concepts including
agents were recalled to a greater extent (M = 3.59, SE = 0.25) than
concepts devoid of agents (M = 2.63, SE = 0.17), t(69) = 2.94, p,
.01. The same was true for ONT concepts: concepts comprised of
agents had a memory advantage (M = 1.92, SE = 0.20), over those
without agents (M = 1.32, SE = 0.14), (t(69) = 2.84, p,.01). Inter-
estingly, for everyday INT concepts, recall did not differ in terms
of agent presence (agents: M = 1.99, SE = 0.17; non-agents:
M = 2.14, SE = 0.16), p = .50.
The two cultural (American and Czech) samples did not differ
in terms of the observed results (p = .27; .48; .74 for differences in
immediate memory recall 1 based on concept category, agent
presence, and interaction between concept category and agent
presence respectively; and p = .11; .70; .65 for differences in
immediate memory recall 2 based on concept category, agent
presence, and interaction between concept category and agent
presence, respectively). In other words, both Americans and
Czechs remembered agents and cultural schema-level information
to a greater extent than non-agents, domain-level violations or
intuitive information. Furthermore, both groups showed equal
propensity toward remembering agents from expectancy-violating
categories (cultural schema-level and domain-level), but memory
for intuitive information was similar for both agents and non-
agents.
Delayed Recognition Memory
The first experiment revealed one of the factors that influence
the memorability of concepts based on what kind of expectancy
violation they possess. As has been suggested by previous research
[1,5], the success of cultural and religious ideas resides not in their
immediate memory advantage, but rather in their memory
advantage over time. Thus, we decided to test participants’ memory
of the concepts presented in Experiment 1 with a surprise
recognition test. Initially, our pilot study demonstrated that recall
after one month is highly impoverished, equal essentially to 161
concept for each participant. For this reason, we decided to use a
recognition test. Participants were emailed approximately one
month after the initial experimental phase with the request to fill
out a brief follow-up questionnaire. They were asked to indicate
which of the concepts they remembered seeing in the first part of
the experiment. All items matched violation type and ontological
categories of the original concepts.
Method
The same subjects who took part in Experiment 1 participated
in this study. Approximately one month (62 days) after the initial
test phase, subjects were contacted via email and invited to
participate in the new study. The test included the initial 48
concepts and an equal number of new, fabricated concepts
(included in the Appendix S1) that were semantically unrelated to
any of the previous concepts (an equal number of fabricated
concepts was created for each concept category in order to match
the concepts previously presented). The participants’ task was to
determine which concepts were presented in the initial study by
highlighting each of the concepts presented.
In total, 72 participants (of the original 75) completed the
recognition test. Subjects received college credit for their
participation.
Results
A 362 (concept category6agent presence) repeated-measures
analysis of variance showed that in terms of recognition, there was
a significant main effect of concept category: F(2,142) = 33.15, p,
.001, g2p = .46; a significant main effect of agent presence:
F(1,71) = 33.86, p,.001, g2p = .32; and a significant interaction of
concept category and agent presence: F(2, 142) = 10.99, p,.001,
g2p = .13. T-tests using Bonferroni correction showed significant
differences between the recognition of CUL and ONT
(t(71) = 4.78, p,.001), CUL and INT (t(71) = 7.72, p,.001), and
ONT and INT (t(71) = 3.56, p,.01). The recognition of CUL
concepts (M = 8.24, SE = 0.47) was superior to ONT concepts
(M = 6.71, SE = 0.47) and INT concepts (M = 5.56, SE = 0.37).
Furthermore, concepts including agents were recognized better
than concepts without agents F(1,71) = 33.86, p,.001. Interest-
ingly, the interaction of agent presence and concept category
indicated that for CUL and ONT, agents-involving concepts were
much better recognized than agents-devoid concepts (agents:
M = 4.94; SE = 0.27; M = 3.71, SE = 0.26; non-agents: M = 3.29;
SE = 0.25; M = 3.00, SE = 0.26, respectively). This was not true for
INT concepts, where no differences between those conditions were
found (agents: M = 3.01, SE = 0.22, non-agents: M = 2.54,
SE = 0.23), even though a similar, but marginally significant trend
was observed (p = .06). For further details, see Table 2 and
Figure 2. The two cultural samples (American and Czech) did not
differ in terms of the observed results (p = .816 for differences in
the Recognition Test based on agent presence, and p = .725 for
the interaction between concept category and agent presence
respectively. Although there was a significant difference in terms of
concept category (p = .014), the trend was still the same as in the
previous experiment (Americans: M CAT = 4.17, M ONT = 2.83,
M INT = 2.78; Czechs: M CAT = 10.14, M ONT = 8.53, M
INT = 6.86).
Figure 1. Mean recall in terms of concept category and
presence of agents. Participants recalled significantly more agents
involving concepts in cultural schema-level and domain-level breaches
condition, however this was not true for intuitive concepts (without
breaches). The figure represents data averaged for immediate Recall 1
and immediate Recall 2. Error bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090684.g001
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Discussion
Our study included stimuli involving cultural schema-level, and
ontological (domain-level) expectation violations, and intuitive
information (ideas without any violation). We used immediate
recall and surprise delayed recognition tasks (one month after the
initial test phase) in order to examine which ideas enjoy memory
advantages and their attractiveness to our cognitive architecture.
Our findings suggest that although violations of ontological
intuitions may confer mnemonic advantages, violations at the
category level are consistently more powerful in creating even
long-term memory effects. Importantly, the presence of agents
plays a crucial role in attracting attention, as shown by the higher
memorability of agents-including concepts across categories.
In Experiment 1 the main interest was to see the effect of
expectation violation type (domain versus cultural schema-level
expectation violation, or no violation) as well as the effect of agent
presence on immediate recall. Both immediate recall tasks showed
that information that includes cultural schema-level violations is
recalled more easily than information with domain-level violations
or without any expectation violation. However, the second recall
test phase demonstrated better recall for both kinds of expectation-
violating information. In the surprise delayed recognition test that
took place one month after the initial learning phase we aimed to
examine the long-term memory effects and resistance toward
forgetting for individual concepts. The two sets of results are fairly
consistent with the previous findings, and together they are in
accordance with proposed hypotheses about the superior memo-
rability of minimally counter-intuitive ideas over time [5].
These results are not very surprising by themselves. In
psychology, the term ‘‘distinctiveness effect’’ refers precisely to
this enhanced memory for distinct events [10,11,12,13,15]– in our
case expectation-violating ideas. Enhanced memory for informa-
tion including expectation violations has been documented in
many studies [14,45,47]. Increased processing of expectation-
violating information has also been reflected in electrophysiolog-
ical studies of social perception [47], concepts embedded in
sentences [37], face perception [48], or unexpected events
embedded in array of expected stimuli [49]. Moreover, it was
shown that items from weakly related words (i.e., unexpected) are
recalled better than strongly related word pairs, the phenomenon
dubbed the ‘‘expectation-violating effect’’ [46]. Based on this
evidence, it seems that expectancy-violating concepts create a
special encoding in our memory, and thus are recalled easier and
to a greater extent than intuitive ones.
Our results provide an important addition to the state of the art
in research on concept memorability, showing that ideas violating
attributes to which we are more conditioned (i.e., culturally
familiar, and thus more likely to occur) are more attractive to our
cognitive architecture compared with ideas that violate ontological
expectations (i.e. those that cannot occur in real life). This finding
might have important evolutionary implications regarding the role
and importance of cultural conditioning in human cognition. Our
brains retain more information about unexpected and unpredict-
able changes in the environment and assign less attention to
familiar stimuli, and cultural environments give specific forms to
this tendency by habituating the mind to certain stimuli more than
others.
Of course, certain types of stimuli, agents being one of them, are
cross-culturally salient. Any kind of intentional agent in our
environment is a potential object of interaction, be it a threat or an
opportunity [39]. Thus, when presented with expectancy viola-
tions that pertain to agents, attention seems to be attracted to this
type of information more than for intuitive, everyday agents or for
expectancy violations that pertain to non-agents. Pascal Boyer [50]
has identified intuitive ontological domains that are cognitive
adaptations used to make sense the various entities in our world.
Figure 2. Surprise delayed recognition performance in terms of
concept category and agent presence. Participants recalled
significantly more agents-involving concepts in cultural schema-level
and domain-level breaches condition; however this was not true for
intuitive concepts (without breaches). Error bars represent standard
errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090684.g002
Table 2. Means (standard error of means) for recall of individual concepts based on the presence of agents.
Recall 1 Recall 2 Delayed Recognition
Cultural schema-level expectancy-violating concepts
Agents 1.49 (0.15) 2.05 (0.15) 4.94 (0.27)
Non-agents 1.04 (0.11) 1.58 (0.12) 3.29 (0.25)
Domain-level expectancy-violating concepts
Agents 0.72 (0.10) 1.20 (0.12) 3.71 (0.26)
Non-agents 0.60 (0.08) 0.70 (0.09) 3.00 (0.26)
Intuitive concepts
Agents 0.72 (0.09) 1.26 (0.10) 3.01 (0.22)
Non-agents 0.74 (0.08) 1.39 (0.12) 2.54 (0.23)
Note. N= 75 (Recall 1, Recall 2), N= 72 (Delayed recognition).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090684.t002
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Those intuitive ontologies (intuitive psychology, biology, and
physics) represent persons, animals, plants, and objects. The most
distinct aspect that separates persons and animals from plants and
objects as ontological domains is the presence of intentionality and
the likely attribution of mental states to the former. This capacity
of attribution of intentionality to animate beings develops as early
as 15 months of age [51], while the understanding of self-
propulsion of animate objects develops at around 5 months of age
[52]. This bias toward agency detection leads to what has been
termed the ‘‘hyperactive agency detection device’’ (HADD) [40];
that is a tendency to over-attribute agency to ambiguous stimuli in
our environment [39]. Thus, the presence of agents that violate
our expectations seems to be a particularly salient feature in
attracting attention; these agents might trigger sensitivities related
to predation, survival, threat, reputation-management, and so on.
Our results add an important nuance to these findings. Intuitive,
mundane ideas are treated by our cognitive systems as equally
attractive and attention-grabbing regardless of agent presence
(whether it is a human or a plant). However, ideas that violate our
expectations (either domain- or cultural schema-level) in a mild
fashion are more memorable if they pertain to agents (humans and
animals) than to non-agents (plants or objects/artifacts. Impor-
tantly, this is the case even for objects and plants that acquire
agent-like qualities, i.e., minimally counterintuitive concepts.
Irrespectively, however, the combination of schema-inconsistent
or expectancy-violating information and agents seems to provide a
cognitive optimum for the memorability of ideas, and by extension
the potential transmittability of these concepts.
These results have certain limitations. In order to achieve the
high level of control provided by the laboratory, one always loses
some relevance and ecological validity. For example, equal
processing times do not occur in real life, where individuals can
allot as much attention as they require to particular stimuli,
creating various associations or narratives in their mind. Impor-
tantly, however, research has demonstrated that the enhanced
memory for distinct events (‘‘the distinctiveness effect’’) is not
modulated by processing time [53].
Furthermore, in the real world, people are not explicitly asked
to remember any fixed set of concepts. Each concept competes
freely and interacts with an enormous number of other concepts,
and among a host of ecological and social factors that play crucial
roles in their ‘‘natural’’ transmission. While this is true, and we
hope further research will investigate the roles of other factors than
the character of the information in memory (such as source
memory), our study still provides important insights on the
organization of information in semantic memory by examining
memorability in the sense of ‘‘all else being equal’’.
Finally, our study only speaks to the memorability of concepts. It
is likely that when it comes to actual entities, domain-level
violations would be more salient that cultural schema-level ones
(actually encountering a talking tree would probably be more
memorable than encountering a wooden bottle). On the other
hand, some concepts (for example religious ones) consist precisely
of impossible ideas that are not encountered in the real world;
although no one has witnessed a resurrection, memes regarding
beings who rise from the dead can often be very successful.
Moreover, imagery levels modulate the memorability power,
though minimally counter-intuitive concepts are not affected by
the extent to which the idea is imaginable [55]. Future studies
could explore the additional effects of the effect of viability (how
likely an idea is to occur), imagery, and social factors in the
memorability of ideas.
Overall, our results reveal some of the complexities of semantic
memory, in particular some of the various parameters that affect
the successful encoding of concepts [50]. Two such parameters are
expectation-violation and the presence of agents. In particular, the
combination of those two conditions places concepts in an optimal
position for attracting attention and making ideas cognitively
appealing and potentially better suited for cultural transmission.
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